

CHAPTER III

The Position of Ferrara

There is a rather brief reference in Cajetan's commentary on the De Ente et Essentia that provides an important point of departure for the problem we are discussing. There are some, Cajetan remarks, who say that being can be taken in two ways, either as a noun or as a participle. Thus, they say that ens nominaliter is what is quidditatively and intrinsically predicated of all things; for in this sense it is true to say that each thing is a being through its essence. In regard to ens participialiter, however, since for them it signifies the same thing as existing, they contend that this is not a quidditative predicate, for nothing outside of God is thus a being through its essence. Moreover, continues Cajetan, they add that ens nominaliter, properly speaking, is what is divided into the predicaments, and what is transcendental and convertible with the good, true, etc., and not ens participialiter. (1)

Cajetan does not mention explicitly who the proponents of this position were, but it is quite probable that he is referring to Ferrara and his school. This appears rather conclusive especially in the light of the arguments which Cajetan proposes against such an interpretation or

(1) "Propter quod a quibusdam dicitur quod ens dupliciter sumitur, scilicet nominaliter et participialiter. Et quod ens nominaliter quidditative et intrinsece de omnibus praedicatur: sic ens unusquodque est ens per essentiam suam. Ens vero participialiter, cum idem sonet quod existens, non est praedicatum quidditativum, sic enim nihil aliud a Deo est ens per essentiam suam: unde secundum istos ens nominaliter convenit naturae absolute, non autem ens participialiter. Addunt quoque quod ens nominaliter est divisum in decem praedicamenta, et est transcendens conversum cum aliis, proprie loquendo, non ens secundo modo". — In De Ente et Essentia, n. 56, p. 88.

position. These arguments appear almost verbatim in the form of objections in the commentary of Ferrara. Whether Ferrara considered himself the principal target of Cajetan's critique or whether he was merely defending his own position and used these arguments as possible objections, it is difficult to determine. The matter is not important, however; and whether or not Cajetan was directly arguing against the position of Ferrara is of little consequence here. What we are interested in mainly is the critique itself. In his usual brief manner Cajetan states this as follows.

Mihi autem aliter dicendum occurrit. Dico enim quod ens participialiter est id quod est transcendens, divisum in decem praedicamenta; quod ex eo patere potest, quod S. Thomas (I Parte, quaest. v et vi, et in quaestionibus de Veritate, quaest. xxi) ostendit bonum, quod etiam dividitur in decem praedicamenta, ut dicitur I Ethicorum, converti cum ente participialiter non nominaliter, ut clare patet ex duobus. (1)

In the first argument Cajetan says that the reasoning of St. Thomas is always the same, whether in the Summa or in the De Veritate; as a thing is being, so is it good, by reason of the convertibility. But a thing is not a being by its essence; neither, therefore, is it good by its essence. (2) The only possible solution, argues Cajetan, is that St. Thomas definitely refers to being in the sense of ens participialiter. For, if being were to be taken or understood in the sense of a noun, it would mean that a

(1) Op. cit., n. 56, p. 88.

(2) "Licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum habet esse, tamen essentia rei creatae non est ipsum esse; et ideo non sequitur quod res creata sit bona per suam essentiam". — Ia, q. 6, a. 3, ad 2.

being would be being by its essence, which St. Thomas has shown is true only of God.

Primo, ex eo quod dicit, quod cum bonum et ens convertantur sicut res est ens, ita bona; sed non est ens per essentiam suam: ergo nec bona. In quo processu, ut fallacia equivocationis vitetur, non nisi de ente participialiter est sermo, (1)

In the second place, continues Cajetan, this is evident from the very fact, as St. Thomas states, (2) that that by which a thing is formally good is not a being; which, if said of ens nominaliter, is false, since the esse actualis existentiae, by which a thing is being and good, can be considered as a noun. Hence, Cajetan concludes, being which is convertible with the good, which is transcendent, divided into the predicaments, is ens participialiter.

Secundo, ex eo quod dicit id quo res formaliter est bona non esse ens, quod dictum de ente nominaliter falsum est: quia esse actualis existentiae, quo res est ens et bona, est ens nominaliter. Ens igitur quod convertitur cum bono, quod est transcendens, divinum in decem praedicamentis, est ens participialiter. (3)

These arguments are taken up and answered quite at length by Ferrara in his commentary on the Summa Contra Gentiles, where he introduces for us the distinction between being taken as a noun and being taken as a parti-

(1) Cajetan, ibid., p. 88.

(2) "Bonitas rei creatae non est ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid superadditum: vel ipsum esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio superaddita, vel ordo ad finem. Ipsa tamen bonitas sic superaddita dicitur bona sicut et ens; hac autem ratione dicitur ens, quia ea est aliquid, non quia ipsa aliquo alio sit. Unde hac ratione dicitur bona, quia ea est aliquid bonum, non quia ipsa habeat aliquam aliam bonitatem, qua sit bona". — Ia, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3.

(3) Cajetan, ibid., p. 88

ciple. (1) The basis for this distinction, however, was occasioned by the reasoning adducted by St. Thomas in proving that God cannot be in a genus. The substance of the argument of St. Thomas is as follows: Everything is placed in a genus by reason of its quiddity. Now, the quiddity of God is ipsum sum esse, according to which nothing is ever placed in a genus; for then being (ens) would be a genus, which signifies the very esse. Being, however, is not a genus, and hence it follows that God cannot be in a genus. (2)

From all indications, it would appear that St. Thomas contends that being signifies esse, i.e. actual existence. For if it were possible, as he says, for God to be in a genus, being would be that genus. This fact is well noted by Ferrara, but it raises a doubt. If being taken in this sense were predicated of all things essentially, as St. Thomas seems to presume here, then it is false; for being in this sense is predicated essentially only of God. On the other hand, being which is predicated essentially is the being that signifies the essence of a thing, which is divided into the ten predicaments, and not the being which signifies esse. Either, there-

fore, the proposition assumed by St. Thomas is false, or else there is a fallacy of equivocation. (3)

(1) Op. cit., c. 25, pp. 78ff.

(2) "Unumquodque collocatur in genere ratione suae quidditatis: genus enim praedicatur in quid est. Sed quidditatis Dei est ipsum sum esse. Secundum quod non collocatur aliquid in genera: quia sic ens esset genus, quod significat ipsum esse. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus non sit in genere".
— Summa Contra Gentiles, I, c. 25.

(3) "Quia ens hic accipi videtur secundum quod significat actualem existentiam: ut patet ex intentione Sancti Thomae volentis, si Deus sit in ge-

It is in reply to this objection that Ferrara outlines his distinction between ens nominaliter and ens participialiter.

Pro solutione huius dubii, quia tota difficultas consistit circa significatum huius termini ens, considerandum est quod, licet ens tam nominaliter quam participialiter sumptum importet esse, utroque enim modo ens significat quod habet esse; tamen aliter importatur per unum modum quam per alterum. Si enim participialiter sumatur, ut idem est absolute quod existens, esse importatur tanquam principale et formale significatum, eo quod est abstractum huius concreti ens; id autem quod habet esse importatur secundario, tanquam susceptivum esse; sicut album primo et formaliter importat albedinem, quod est eius abstractum, secundario autem importat subiectum, eo quod ipsam albedinem significet per modum alteri inherens. (1)

In both of these acceptations, it is to be noted, being implies esse; in each case being signifies that which has esse. The difference is in the manner in which they signify it. If being is taken as a principle, esse is implied as the principal and formal thing signified; that which has esse is implied secondarily, as that which is susceptible of esse. As for being taken as a noun, Ferrara contends, its principal and formal signification is essence, and not esse; this latter, however,

nere, oportere ut ens sit genus eius, quia quidditas Dei est esse, scilicet actualis existentiae, ens autem significat ipsum esse. Modo, falsum est quod ens taliter acceptum de omnibus essentialiter praedicatur, ut videtur supponere Sanctus Thomas, et nihil sit praeter entis rationem: nam, secundum ipsum, alio de solo Deo essentialiter praedicatur. Ens enim quod essentialiter praedicatur, est ens quod significat essentiam rei, quod etiam dividitur in decem praedicamenta, ut dicitur V Metaph; non autem ens quod significat esse. Ergo aut assumitur falsum: aut committitur fallacia equivocationis, dum primo sumitur ens participialiter, posterius vero nominaliter. — Ferraricensis, op. cit., n. VI, p. 70.

(1) Ibid., n. VII.

is implied secondarily as that from which the name of being is taken. In other words, ens nominaliter properly signifies essence, but since it is drawn from esse, it signifies esse secondarily.

Si autem nominaliter sumatur, sic esse non est eius abstractum, sed essentia. Ideo principaliter eius significatum non est esse, sed essentia; esse autem importatur per ipsum tanquam id a quo nomen imponitur; sicut, si lapis dicatur esse quod offendit pedem, offensio pedis importatur secundo, tanquam id a quo imponitur nomen, essentia autem eius tanquam principale significatum. Patet autem hoc ex Sancto Thoma in X Metaph., in expositione text. 8, ubi ait quod ens per decem praedicamenta divinum significat ipsas naturas decem generum, secundum quod sunt actu vel potentia. (1)

This distinction made, Ferrara concludes that being in the argument of St. Thomas is to be taken as signifying esse, but not however as the principal thing signified, but as that from which the name is taken. (2) This is, moreover, the being that is divided into the predicaments and what is essentially predicated of all things, which Aristotle proves is not a genus, and not ens participialiter.

Dicitur ergo primo, quod ens divinum in decem praedicamenta est ens nominaliter sumptum, quod scilicet significat essentiam primo, tanquam rem significatam, et secundo esse, tanquam id a quo ipsum nomen imponitur. Dicitur secundo, quod hoc est quod de omnibus essentialiter praedicatur, et quod Philosophus probat non esse genus: non autem ens participialiter sumptum, cuius principale significatum est esse, tanquam eius abstractum. (3)

(1) Ibid., n. VII.

(2) "Ad dubium ergo principale dicitur primo, quod accipitur ens secundum quod significat esse, non quidem tanquam principale significatum, sed tanquam id a quo imponitur nomen. Et tale est ens nominaliter sumptum". — Ibid., n. IX.

(3) Ibid., n. VIII.

Let us see now the proofs that Ferrara offers to substantiate his position that (a) being divided into the ten predicaments in ens nominaliter sumptum, and that (b) being taken in this sense is that which is predicated of all things essentially, and not ens participialiter sumptum. First of all, we shall consider the texts of St. Thomas, especially those cited by Ferrara himself, which seem to confirm this view; secondly, we shall take up the response of Ferrara to the objections raised by Cajetan. We shall then attempt, from the precisions which Ferrara outlines, to construct what we think would logically be the metaphysical position of Ferrara if it were developed more fully.

The capital text from St. Thomas, which Ferrara has already mentioned as confirming his position that ens nominaliter sumptum, or being as signifying primarily essence and secondarily esse, is the being that is divided into the predicaments, is the following.

Ens quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, significat ipsas naturas decem generum secundum quod sunt actu vel potentia. (1)

There are a number of other texts in the Metaphysics which express this same idea, but this one is the clearest utterance on the point. For instance, in Book IV and again in Book VII of the Metaphysics, St. Thomas

(1) In X Metaph., lect. 3, n. 1982.

expresses himself in this way.

Sciendum est enim quod hoc nomen Homo, imponitur a quidditate, sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen Res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi: et hoc nomen Unum, ab ordine vel indivisione. Est enim unum ens indivisum. Idem autem est quod habet essentiam et quidditatem per illam essentiam, et quod est in se indivisum. Unde ista tria, res, ens, unum, significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes. (1)

Et ideo hoc nomen Ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia. (2)

Primo proponit intentum quod ens dicitur multipliciter, ut dictum est in quinto libro, in quo diviserat quoties dicuntur huiusmodi nomina, quia quoddam ens significat "quid est et hoc aliquid", id est substantiam; ut per quid intelligitur essentia substantie, per hoc aliquid suppositum..... Et cum ens tot modis dicatur, patet est quod inter omnia entia, primum est quod quid est, id est ens quod significat substantiam. (3)

Although the above passages appear to substantiate the view of Ferrara, they are not as clear and explicit as the one cited by Ferrara himself, and evidently for that reason he did not feel it necessary to include them in his arguments. Among other basic texts of St. Thomas in the same vein we might note the following: the first is from the Summa Theologiae, the second is from the De Malo.

Sicut dicitur in V Metaph., ens dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo secundum quod significat entitatem rei, prout dividitur per decem predicamenta, et sic convertitur cum re. Alio modo dicitur ens quod significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verum est; et hoc est ens quo respondetur ad quaestionem an est. (4)

(1) In IV Metaph., lect. 2, n. 553.

(2) Ibid., n. 558.

(3) In VII Metaph., lect. 1, n. 1247.

(4) Ia, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2.

Ens dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod significat naturam decem generum..... quia esse aliquid non solum significat quod respondetur ad questionem an est, sed etiam quod respondetur ad questionem quid est. (1)

There are, moreover, other passages where St. Thomas seems to be even more explicit. Because of the importance of this text from the De Veritate, we shall quote it in full.

Aliter se habet in formis generalibus, et aliter in formis specialibus. In formis enim specialibus non recipitur praedicatio concreti de abstracto, ut dicatur, Albedo est alba, vel calor est calidus, ut patet per Dionysium, li. cap. de divinis Nominibus; sed in formis generalibus huiusmodi praedicati recipitur; dicimus enim quod essentia est ens, et bonitas est bona, et unitas una, et sic de aliis. Cujus ratio est, quia illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens; unde oportet quod cuicumque apprehenso per intellectum, intellectus attribuat hoc quod est ens. Et ideo cum apprehendit essentiam alicujus entis, dicit illam essentiam esse ens; et similiter unamquamque formam generalem et specialem, ut bonitas est ens, albedo est ens, et sic de aliis..... Sed album, quia est speciale, non communicat inseparabiliter rationem entis; unde potest apprehendi forma albedinis sine eo quod attribuitur ei esse album; unde non cogimur dicere, Albedo est alba. Album enim uno modo dicitur; ens autem et unum et bonum, et alia huiusmodi, quae de quolibet apprehenso necesse est dici, multipliciter dicuntur. Aliquid enim dicitur ens, quia in se subsistit; aliquid, quia est principium subsistendi, ut forma; aliquid, quia est dispositio subsistentis, ut qualitas; aliquid, quia est privatio dispositionis subsistentis, ut caecitas. (2)

This is the principal passage upon which Ferrara bases his proof. In this article, he shows, St. Thomas is discussing precisely being as divided into the predicaments, and by laying down the rule that in general forms a concrete term can be predicated of an abstract term, and especially by the

(1) De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 19.

(2) De Ver., q. 21, a. 4, ad 4.

example he gives of being as predicated of essence, St. Thomas clearly shows that the principal and formal signification of being is essence. This, it will be recalled, is exactly the definition given of ens nominaliter by Ferrara. Further confirmation of this is found in the first article of the same question, where St. Thomas states that the essence of a thing is sufficient, absolutely speaking, for something to be called a being.

Patet ex Sancto Thoma Ver., q. 21, a. 4, ad 4, ubi loquitur, ut articulo primo illius questionis patet, de ente diviso in decem praedicamenta. Ibi enim, ponens regulam quod in formis generalibus recipitur praedicatio concreti de abstracto, inductive hoc ostendit, inquit, Dicimus enim quod essentia est ens, et bonitas est bona, et unitas una, et sic de aliis, ubi constat quod essentiam tanquam abstractum et primum ac formale significatum entis ponit. (1)

This same conclusion is drawn by Ferrara from a passage in the Quaestiones Quodlibetales. Since Ferrara himself quotes the significant parts, we can confine ourselves merely to his summarisation.

In secundo Quolibet., q. 2, a. 1, ponit ens, secundum quod significat rem cui convenit esse, significare essentiam rei et dividi in decem genera, licet, secundum quod significat esse, sit praedicatum accidentale, ut dat intelligere. (2)

This concludes Ferrara's proof for the first part of his thesis. In support of his second proposition, namely, that ens nominaliter is that which is predicated of all things essentially and not ens participialiter,

(1) Ibid., n. VII, 2.

(2) Ibid., 2.

Ferrara maintains that this is evident from the very fact, as St. Thomas points out repeatedly, that there is a real distinction between essence and existence in all creatures and that esse is not included in the ratio of finite beings. For that reason, ens participialiter, since it implies esse formally as the primary thing signified, cannot be predicated essentially of creatures, and consequently it is not the being which is proved in the Metaphysics not to be a genus. The formal signification of ens being essentially and not by participation. (2)

Secundum vero probatur, quia Sanctus Thomas tenet esse in omni creatura realiter ab essentia distingui, et quod in nullius creaturae ratione perfecta includitur, ut patet Ver., q. 10, a. 12, et alibi. Sic enim patet quod id quod importat esse tanquam primum significatum, non potest de creatura essentialiter praedicari, et consequenter non est illud ens de quo probat Philosophus quod non est genus hac ratione quia de omnibus praedicatur. (1) ens participialiter

are not the same thing, at least from the viewpoint of signification. The above points should be sufficiently clear to enable us to grasp the principal factors of Ferrara's position. Now we can proceed to take up Ferrara's answer to the arguments of Cajetan. (2) These arguments might be valid, Ferrara contends, if it were true that being when taken just as being does which is divided by potency and act, but with this difference as a noun did not signify esse, but only when taken as a participle. But since that it signifies the essence as existing, or the essence under the this is absolutely false; and consequently the arguments fail because they were based on a gratuitous and false assumption. As was indicated earlier,

both ens nominaliter and ens participialiter signify esse. The difference between the two is that, while the latter signifies esse primarily and formally, the former signifies esse secondarily and tangentially. Sed verum est quod, cum nominaliter sumitur, importat esse secundario et tanquam id a quo dependit nomen; cum autem participialiter accipitur, dicit esse non tantum sicut id a quo nomen dependit, sed etiam tanquam res principaliter significatam; constat enim in doctrina Sancti Thomae id a quo nomen importatur, (1) Ibid., 12, dicitur, in aliquid idem esse. -- Ibid., II, VIII, 4.

(2) For the arguments of Cajetan against the position of ens nominaliter see pages 38, 39. Ibid. nomen significat secundario et eius a quo nomen importatur, hoc ratione significanti principali non sit ens per participationem, sed per essentiam. -- Ibid., 4.

mally, the former signifies esse secondarily and as that from which the name is taken. Furthermore, continues Ferrara, the arguments fail to take account of the doctrine of St. Thomas, according to which the source from which the name is derived and what the name signifies are the same in some cases. (1) For that reason, nothing prevents ens nominaliter from being designated being by participation by reason of its secondary signification, although by reason of its formal signification it is being essentially and not by participation. (2)

Even granting that St. Thomas says that the good is convertible with being in act, this in no way allows us to assume, as Cajetan contends, that it is ens participialiter. For, being in act and ens participialiter are not the same thing, at least from the viewpoint of signification. As Ferrara states, ens participialiter, which is the same thing as existing, formally signifies esse and secondarily the essence to which the esse belongs; whereas being in act formally signifies the essence, just as being does which is divided by potency and act, but with this difference that it signifies the essence as existing, or the essence under the esse. ens participialiter signifies the essence as existing, or the essence under the esse.

(1) "Ad haec dicitur primo in communi, quod procedunt ex falso fundamento; scilicet quod ens, cum nominaliter sumitur, non dicat esse, sed tantum cum sumitur participialiter. Hoc enim falsissimum est; cum utroque modo, ut superius diximus, significet id quod habet esse. Sed verum est quod, cum nominaliter sumitur, importat esse secundario et tanquam id a quo imponitur nomen; cum autem participialiter accipitur, dicit esse non tantum sicut id a quo nomen imponitur, sed etiam tanquam rem principaliter significatam; constat enim in doctrina Sancti Thomae id a quo nomen imponitur, et id cui imponitur, in aliquibus idem esse". --- Ibid., n. VIII, 2.

(2) "Ex quo sequitur quod, nominaliter accipiundo ens, aliquid potest dici ens per participationem ratione significati secundari et eius a quo nomen imponitur, licet ratione significati primarii non sit ens per participationem, sed per essentiam". --- Ibid., 2.

act of existing, and consequently it signifies existence only secondarily.

Attendendum autem quod non est idem dicere ens in actu secundum quod ens dividitur per ens in actu et ens in potentia, et ens participialiter sumptum. Quia ens actu quod dividit ens, primo et formaliter significat essentiam, sicut et ens quod dividitur: sed significat illam ut est sub esse actualis existentiae; per quod differt an ente in potentia, quod significat essentiam absque esse actuali. Et idem ens in actu secundo significat esse. Ens autem participialiter sumptum, quod idem est quod existens, ut dictum est, significat primo et formaliter ipsum esse; secundo autem ipsam essentiam cui convergit esse modo. Unde, licet velit Sanctus Thomas quod bonum convertatur cum ente in actu, non tamen vult quod convertatur cum ente participialiter sumpto, quantum ad significatum primae et formae. (1)

At first sight, this might seem to be just another way of describing ens nominaliter. But, as Ferrara points out, being in act is not the same as ens nominaliter, but is, in a way, a subdivision of ens nominaliter. For the latter implies existence, but only in so far as being is drawn from esse; it does not, however, imply the essence as existing. Being in act, on the other hand, signifies existence, but not as that from which being is drawn but rather only in so far as it signifies the essence as existing: essentia sub esse. Being in act, then, is a subdivision of ens nominaliter, because being which is divided into the predicaments, according to St. Thomas, is being in act or being in potency.

In regard to the first argument of Cajetan, namely, that just as a thing is not being through its essence neither is it good by its essence, apart from the fact that it is based on the false assumption that being

(1) Ibid., 2.

in the sense of ens nominaliter signifies only essence and not esse, likewise adduces reasons, argues Ferrara, which, as a matter of fact, St. Thomas does not state. On the contrary, in De Veritate (1) St. Thomas says very plainly that the essence of a thing is designated as good in the same manner as it is designated as being. Consequently, just as it has an esse by participation, so also is it good by participation. In this way a created essence is being by participation, not by reason of its formal signification, but by reason of its connotative or secondary signification, which is esse. Thus, since the created essence has an esse which is participated and distinct from itself, it can rightly be designated as being by participation even in the sense of ens nominaliter, by reason of the very esse which this latter connotes.

Sed bene in Quaest. de Ver., (Sanctum Thomas) ait: Hoc modo essentia denominatur bona sicut et ens. Unde, sicut habet esse per participationem, ita et bona est per participationem..... Quia enim essentia creata habet esse distinctum a se et participatum, ens nominaliter sumptum ratione ipsius esse dicitur de illa per participationem. Et sic falsum est quod in illa ratione accipitur ens participialiter, non nominaliter. (2)

To the second argument of Cajetan that the esse actualis existentiae by which a thing is being and good is an ens nominaliter, Ferrara answers that esse is not a being in the sense of something which has esse, even if being is taken nominally, but it is being in the sense of that by which something

(1) De Ver., q. 21, a. 5, ad 6.

(2) Ferrariensis, op. cit., n. VIII, 3.

has esse. It is true, ens nominaliter is said to be primarily that which has esse, but it is also said to be that by which something is, and consequently the argument does not hold. (1)

But here another difficulty might be raised. If the good is convertible with ens nominaliter, as Ferrara says, and the good is found in all the predicaments, then the good must be convertible with being as divided by potency and act, for this is the being that is divided into the predicaments, and not just with being in act only. But in answering the arguments of Cajetan, Ferrara admitted that the good is convertible with being in act. These statements would seem to be not only contradictory, but no matter which one is upheld it would lead to inconveniences that could not be sustained. In the first place, if ens nominaliter is the being that is convertible with the good, then one is forced to admit that the good is convertible with being in potency, which, from the texts cited above, is contrary to what St. Thomas upholds. On the other hand, if it be admitted that the good is convertible only with being in act, then it is difficult to see how it is convertible with being as found in the predicaments, which is divided by potency and act.

Ferrara recognized the difficulty involved here, especially for one who did not thoroughly understand the notion of ens nominaliter. The

(1) "Ad secundum patet solutio ex ipsis Sancti Thomae verbis ibidem, ubi inquit quod esse non dicitur ens per aliquod esse aliud, sed quia per ipsum res esse dicitur. Esse ergo non est ens sicut id quod habet esse, nominaliter etiam sumendo ens: sed sicut id quo aliquid habet esse. Ens enim nominaliter sumptum primo quidem dicitur id quod habet esse; secundo vero etiam et id quo aliquid est". — Ibid., 3.

difficulty, as Ferrara shows, is merely on the surface. There is no contradiction whatsoever involved in maintaining that being as divided into the predicaments is ens nominaliter, and that being convertible with the good is being in act. For, just as being common to potency and act is divided into the predicaments, so also is being in act. Hence, not only being is divided by potency and act, but each genus of being; for in each genus one part is as potency, the other part as act. Thus, being in potency is divided into the ten predicaments, and likewise being in act.

Respondetur ad hoc quod, sicut ens commune actui et potentiae dividitur in decem praedicamenta, ita et ens in actu. Unde non solum ens dividitur in potentiam et actum, sed et quodlibet genus entis; quia in quolibet genere aliquid est ut potentia, et aliquid ut actus. Unde ens in potentia dividitur in decem praedicamenta, et similiter ens in actu. Aliqua enim est potentia de genere substantiae, et aliqua de genere qualitatis, et sic de aliis; et similiter aliquis actus est de genere substantiae, et aliquis de genere qualitatis, et sic de aliis. (1)

It might further be objected that if the good is convertible with ens nominaliter sumptum essentially, and this appears to be the mind of St. Thomas when he says that being and the good are the same in reality and that the good adds to being only the relation to the intellect, it would seem to follow that goodness and the essence of a thing are identical. It is impossible, however, to admit such a conclusion, for St. Thomas has unmistakably shown that the goodness of a finite thing is not

(1) Ibid., n. X.

its essence; (1). On the other hand, if goodness, which is the formality signified by the good, is not the same as essence, which is the formality signified by being, one is faced with the equally obvious incompatible stand that the good adds something real to being, and as a consequence it is not essentially convertible with being.

The difficulty mentioned here, Ferrara contends, is due largely to a misunderstanding of the notion of ens nominaliter. In the first place, it is one thing to speak of being absolutely and quite another to speak of being in act. In the former case, being signifies formally only the essence, i.e. that upon which the name of being is imposed; it signifies esse only secondarily and connotatively. Being in act, however, not only signifies the essence but also the very esse itself. In this way, actual being, which is what is formally signified by being in act, connotes the essence primarily and the esse secondarily, but the connotation of esse here is not merely in the sense that it is something implied by the essence, as in the former case where being is considered absolutely; but also as the very actuality of the essence. (2) In the second place, since the good

(1) "Bonitas rei creatas non est ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid superadditum; vel ipsum esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio superaddita, vel ordo ad finem". -- *Ist.*, q. 6, a. 3, ad 3.

(2) "Considerandum est primo, quod aliud est dicere ens absolute, et aliud dicere ens in actu. Ens enim absolute sumptum significat tantum essentiam tanquam id cui nomen imponitur; esse vero significat tanquam id a quo imponitur nomen. Ens vero in actu non significat tantum essentiam, sed etiam ipsum esse. Unde entitas in actu, quae est formale significatum entis in actu, dicitur essentiam primo, et secundo connotat esse, non tantum ut a quo nomen imponitur, sed etiam ut actualitatem essentiae". -- *Ferrariensis, op. cit.*, n. XI, 2.

and being in act are convertible essentially, just as being in act signifies formally the essence and esse so also does the good signify the essence and esse. For that reason, goodness, which is the formality signified by the good, must include these two notions in the same way as they are inclined in the notion of being in act, and consequently goodness does not denote the essence only, not the esse only, but the essence as actualized by esse. (1) In the third place, just as being in act signifies the essence as the root or source of being and esse as the actuality and, as it were, the complement of actual being, in the same manner the good signifies the essence as a fundamental goodness and the esse as completed or determined goodness. (2)

It is quite clear, then, that such a difficulty as mentioned in the objection, concludes Ferrara, is due simply to a confusion of being in the absolute sense with being in act, as well as an unwarranted assumption that being in act which is convertible with the good signifies only essence and no esse. (3) It is quite evident, however, from what has been said, as Ferrara proceeds to point out next, that essence is not the total formality

(1) "Considerandum secundo quod, cum bonum et ens actu sint essentialiter convertibilia, oportet ut, sicut ens actu significat formaliter essentiam et esse, ita etiam bonum illa significet. Et similiter oportet quod bonitas, quae est formale significatum boni, illa duo includat, sicut ab entitate in actu includuntur. Et sic bonitas non dicit tantum essentiam rei, neque tantum esse, sed essentiam sub esse". — Ibid., n. XI, -2.

(2) "Considerandum tertio quod, sicut ens actu significat essentiam tanquam fundamentum essendi, esse autem tanquam actualitatem essendi et tanquam complementum entitatis in actu, ita bonum significat essentiam tanquam bonitatem fundamentalem, esse vero tanquam completivum et determinativum". — Ibid., 2.

(3) Ibid., 3.

of being in act, but essence as actualized by esse. Consequently, the good does not add anything real to being in act in so far as its total formal signification is concerned, but only as regards its partial signification. (1) Nor does this involve any difficulty, Ferrara continues, since being in act, in quite the same fashion, adds to essence; for the former not only signifies essence but also esse. (2)

Thus, when St. Thomas says that the goodness of a finite thing is not its very essence, this may be seen to be true in two ways. If one considers total and completed goodness, as including both the essence and esse, then the goodness of a thing is not altogether identical with the essence, although in a certain way it is identical with it. On the other hand, if we consider completive or terminative goodness, then it is not identical with the essence, for such a goodness is esse. (3) In the same way, when St. Thomas asserts that the goodness of a thing is the actus essendi, he is speaking not of total and completed goodness, but rather of completive or terminative goodness. (4)

(1) "Essentia non est totale significatum entis in actu, sed essentia cum esse. Et ideo non sequitur quod bonus addit aliquid reale supra ens actu quantum ad eius totale significatum, sed tantum quantum ad significatum eius partiale". — Ibid., 3.

(2) "Hoc autem non est inconveniens: sic enim et ipsum ens actu addit supra essentiam; quia non solum dicit essentiam, sed etiam esse". — Ibid.

(3) "Dictum Sancti Thomae habet veritatem dupliciter. Primo, de bonitate totali et completa. Talis enim, cum includat essentiam et esse, non est idem omnino cum essentia rei, licet sit aliquo modo idem. — Secundo, de bonitate completiva, et terminativa. Talis enim non est idem quod essentia: quia talis bonitas est esse; in creaturis autem esse et essentia distinguuntur". — Ibid., 3.

(4) "Quod autem saepe dicit Sanctum Thomam..... bonitatem rei esse actum essendi, intelligitur non de completa et totali bonitate, sed de bonitate completiva et terminativa". — Ibid., 3.

In summing up, then, Ferrara concludes that the intention of St. Thomas does not require that being signify other than what has been established in the foregoing reasoning. For since being signifies that to which esse belongs and predicates the essence of each and everything; and since in God essence is the same in reality as esse, nothing could possibly be his genus unless it implied esse absolutely and without limit, either primarily or secondarily. Such, however, is being even when taken as a noun; for it implies esse absolutely secondarily and the quiddity principally. And thus it is that in God it signifies quiddity which is the very esse. (1)

For the same reason, it is not false to say, as a matter of fact it is true, that being which signifies esse as that from which the name of being is taken is predicated essentially of things, i.e. as regards its primary and formal signification. But it would certainly be false, of course, if it were said that ens participialiter, which signifies esse principally, is what is predicated essentially of things. (2)

(1) "Dicitur secundo, quod ad intentionem Sancti Thomae non requiritur quod ens alio modo significet esse quam diximus. Cum enim ens significet id cui convenit esse, et praedicet essentiam cuiuslibet rei; in Deo autem ens essentialiter sit idem realiter quod esse; nihil poterit esse genus eius nisi importet ipsum esse absolute et illimitate, aut primo aut secundo. Tale autem est ens etiam nominaliter sumptum: importat enim esse absolute secundo, et quidditatem principaliter. Et sic in Deo significat quidditatem quae est ipsum esse". — Ibid., n. IX.

(2) "Dicitur tertio, quod non est falsum, immo verum est quod ens quod significat esse tenquam id a quo nomen imponitur, essentialiter de rebus praedicatur, quantum ad summa primam et formale significationem. Sed bene falsum est quod ens participialiter sumptum, quod principaliter esse significat, essentialiter praedicatur, et quod nihil sit praeter edus rationem". — Ibid.

The above points should be sufficient to guarantee us at least a summary view of the doctrine of ens nominaliter as described by Ferrara. As can be gathered from the preceding considerations, the position of Ferrara is quite different from the manner in which it is described by Cajetan. As far as it is possible to judge, Cajetan seems to have viewed the notion of ens nominaliter as being synonymous with that of essence, and consequently he rejected the distinction as not only inadequate and useless, but also as being in a way somewhat inconsonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas, as he clearly shows in his arguments against such an interpretation. Viewed, of course, in that sense, it is quite easy to understand why Cajetan would oppose such an interpretation of being; and he would be, in every respect, justified in his criticism. But as Ferrara has clearly shown, and with a remarkable precision that manifests his thorough acquaintance with this position, there is absolutely no basis whatsoever for such an assumption.

If such, then, was Cajetan's conception of ens nominaliter, as distinguished from that of Ferrara's, it is quite possible that he likewise may have understood ens participialiter in a somewhat different fashion than as explained by Ferrara. But this is a point that will have to be dealt with separately, when we come to take up the position of Cajetan itself.

Understood, therefore, in its proper perspective, the position of ens nominaliter as adopted by Ferrara seems to be justified. In the light of the above analysis, then, we can feel safe in concluding that for Ferrara the proper formality signified by being is essence; that being in the sense of ens nominaliter signifies primarily essence and secondarily existence or

esse; that this is the being which is divided into the predicaments and which is predicated essentially of all things, and which is, moreover, the being which St. Thomas and Aristotle both show in the Metaphysics cannot be a genus. (1)

The position of Ferrara not only seems to be justified but it reveals, at the same time, a rather unusual and remarkable insight into the problem of being. This is a point we shall attempt to develop more fully in the following pages. Using the principles as outlined by Ferrara as a guide we shall undertake, therefore, to construct what we think might be a more extensive expression of what this position professes. It would certainly be unfair to Ferrara if we maintained that what is here adopted is in any way an interpretation of his own doctrine. Consequently, that shall not be our purpose. Our chief concern shall be with the principles themselves and what, it would seem, are the logical consequences in which they issue, once the possibilities they offer are given their full development.

In doing so, we may take as a starting-point the nominal definition of being as given by St. Thomas: ens est quod est, or simply, quod est. The best explanation, perhaps, of this common notion is to be found in St. Thomas' commentary on I Perihemenias.

Ens nihil est aliud quam quod est. Et sic videtur et res significare, per hoc quod dico QUOD et esse, per hoc quod dico EST. Et si

(1) Ibid., n. VII, 2.

quidem haec dictio ens significaret esse principaliter, sicut significat res quae habet esse, procul dubio significaret aliquid esse. Sed ipsam compositionem, quae importatur in hoc quod dico EST, non principaliter significat, sed consignificat eam in quantum significat res habentem esse. (1)

This text raises a number of interesting points. In the first place, it seems to be a remarkable confirmation of what Ferrara has maintained in regard to ens nominaliter. As is clearly indicated here, being signifies primarily the quod and only indirectly or by way of consequence the est. It does not signify primarily the esse, but only in so far as it signifies the thing having esse. Moreover, this passage offers a clue to a number of other well-known passages where St. Thomas invariably contrasts the radical difference between what he calls the quod est and esse. The basic approach to this fundamental antithesis is clearly outlined in the De Ente et Essentia, where St. Thomas lays down the rule that essence and existence are distinct because we can have different concepts of them; one can be perfectly understood without the other. If this is true, then existence must be something extrinsic to the essence, something coming from without and entering into composition with the essence, for no essence can be understood without those elements which form part of the essence. (2) Now, existence

(1) In I Perihemenasias, Isot. 5, n. 20.

(2) "Quidquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quidditatis, hoc est adveniens extra, et faciens compositionem cum essentia; quia nulla essentia sine his quae sunt partes essentiae intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quidditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo: Possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel phoenix, et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura". — De Ente et Essentia, c. 4.

is not the essence of any created thing: no creature is its own existence, but is something that has existence, for in everything created that which has existence is different from the existence which it has. (1) Thus, it is that being is not predicated of creatures essentially, but only of God, whose essence is identical with his existence.

Ens autem non ponitur in definitione creaturae, quia nec est genus nec differentia; unde participatur sicut aliquid non existens de essentia rei; et ideo alia quaestio est an est et quid est. Unde, cum came quod est praeter essentiam rei, dicitur accidens; esse quod pertinet ad quaestionem an est, est accidens. (2)

There are many other statements which repeat this same thought. There are two especially that deserve attention, in so far as they go further than the above texts in projecting this distinction beyond the simple notion of essence to that of substance and the suppositum. The first statement occurs in the Summa Contra Gentiles, where St. Thomas, in discussing the difference between the composition of substance and existence and that of matter and form, says the following:

Ipsa esse non est proprius actus materiae, sed substantiae totius. Eius enim actus est esse de quo possumus dicere quod sit. Esse autem non dicitur de materia, sed de toto. Unde materia non potest dici quod est, sed ipsa substantia est id quod est.... Deinde quia ex ipsam formam comparatur ipsa esse ut actus. Per hoc enim in compositis ex materia et forma dicitur forma esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae, cuius actus est ipsum esse. Unde in compositis ex materia et forma nec materia nec forma potest dici

(1) "Nulla enim creatura est summa esse, sed est habens esse..... in quolibet creatura est aliud ipsa creatura quae habet esse et ipsum esse ejus".
— Quod., 2, 2, 3c.

(2) Quod., 2, 2, 3c.

ipsum quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse; ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens. (1)

In other words, the substance, thus considered, involves a twofold composition of potency and act: the form which determines the matter, thus giving rise to a specific nature; and existence which is the ultimate act and perfection of the whole substance thus composed. If we consider the suppositum, we may even go further and say there is a threefold actualizing quo involved in every composite substance: (a) the form which actualizes the matter; (b) the nature that results from the union of matter and form, e.g. humanity; (c) the act of existing. (2)

The other reference we have in mind is to be found in St. Thomas' commentary on the De Hebdomadibus. Following Boethius, St. Thomas distinguishes three major characteristics that differentiate the quod est and esse: (a) the first difference cited is as follows: esse is not as yet anything. But the quod est, having received the form of esse, is, and has consistency; (b) the second difference between the two notions is: the quod est can participate in something else, but esse participates in no way in anything; (c) the third difference is: quod est can have something besides what it itself is, but the esse has no admixture of anything besides itself. (3)

De Hebdomadibus, c. 2.

(1) Contra Gentiles, II, c. 54.

(2) "In substantiis autem compositis ex materia et forma est duplex compositio actus et potentiae: prima quidem ipsius substantiae, quae componitur ex materia et forma; secunda vero ex ipsa substantia iam composita et esse; quae etiam potest dici ex quod est et esse; vel ex quod est et quo est". — Ibid., c. 54.

(3) Boethius, De Hebdom., c. 2.

The most significant facts entering into these differences might be summed up in this way: Although both the quod est and esse are the most universal notions, they are not related to one another as one abstract notion to another, or as a less universal to the more universal, but rather as the most universal by way of concretion (quod) to the most universal by way of abstraction (esse). Anything that is signified in the abstract, that is, as something by which something is such or such, cannot, thus considered, have anything extraneous added to what it is. But when a thing is signified in the concrete it may have something which is not of the nature of that by which it is such. Now, esse is signified as abstract, so that it can have no admixture of anything besides its essence. But the quod est is signified as concrete, and thus it can have something more than what it itself is. (1)

The point that stands out in all the texts we have thus far considered, besides the real distinction between essence and existence, is the insistence of St. Thomas that existence is something wholly outside the order of essence. It is this factor especially that must be kept in mind, if one is to understand what lies behind the signification of being as outlined by Ferrara. For, since esse is something outside or distinct from the quod est, even though the latter in order to be must participate in the former, nevertheless, esse is not included formally and primarily in its signification. Esse signifies primarily the quod. It signifies esse only in so far as it signifies the thing which has esse. St. Thomas returns constantly to the fact

that ens is drawn from esse and signifies the same thing as the name which is taken from the essence. (1) Thus, ens which is taken from the act of existing and res which is taken from the quiddity signify exactly the same thing. Both signify the quod, the thing which is. (2)

It is possible to consider, as we have already noted, a threefold actualizing quo in each composite substance. Only two of these need concern us at present: essence and existence. Essence is a quo; existence is a quo. Both play the role of quo to the quod. It is the quod, consequently, which is in play here. It is the same thing which has essence and it is the same thing which has existence. The problem, then, is how to designate the quod precisely so as to signify these determinations it receives, i.e. essence and existence. When it is a case of signifying the quod by res, there is no difficulty. St. Thomas constantly speaks of res as drawn from the quiddity, the essence, and that it never signifies, except for God, existence, or the essence in existence. It signifies purely and simply the essence. On the other hand, if we signify the quod by the determination esse, then we designate it by ens. But since the esse is not constitutive or of the ratio of the quod, it is necessary to distinguish that to which

(1) "Et ideo hoc nomen Ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia". — In IV Metaph., lect. 2, n. 558.

(2) "Hoc nomen Res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi; et hoc nomen Unum, ab ordine vel indivisione... Idem autem est quod habet essentiam et quidditatem per illam essentiam, et quod est in se individuum. Unde ista tria, res, ens, unum, significant eandem idem, sed secundum diversas rationes". — Ibid., n. 553.

the name is applied (quod) and that from which the name is drawn (esse). There is no reason for making this distinction in the case of essence, because here the name (res) which designates the essence is drawn from the quiddity immediately, and is implied essentially and intrinsically in the quod. But, if we want to designate the quod by esse, then there is the distinction between that from which the name is taken and that to which the name is imposed.

Thus, ens signifies formally and principally the same thing as the res, namely, the quod and what is constitutive of the quod. It signifies esse only secondarily and as that from which the name is drawn. Because esse is not constitutive or of the ratio of the quod, the quod is indifferent, we might say, to esse, and can be designated indifferently by res or by ens, depending upon the determination which we wish to designate. When we designate the quod by ens, then we signify the subject of the proper act of esse; esse is the proper act of the quod. On the other hand, when we designate the quod by res, then we signify the subject which has essence, abstracting from whether or not it has existence. In either case, therefore, what is signified formally and principally is the quod and what is constitutive of the quod.

What we have touched upon here briefly should indicate some of the principal factors that might be considered as expressive, in a general way, of the position of ens nominaliter as conceived by Ferrara. Many of these points are discussed more at length by modern scholastic authors; and for that reason a more detailed examination of these factors will be found when we take up the individual authors themselves. This will be the subject of our inquiry in the following pages.

Whatever may have been the reasons behind Ferrara's approach to the problem of being, we cannot deny the remarkable influence this position has had on subsequent scholastic thought. Almost without exception, most of the standard text-books have adopted the same basic distinctions of ens nominaliter and ens participialiter as outlined by Ferrara. In order to complete our exposition of this position, then, we shall assemble what might be considered as the modern or contemporary expression of this doctrine. For obvious reasons, we shall confine ourselves to the most typical examples.

In introducing the views of others there is always the danger of misinterpretation. For that reason, we do not believe that any attempt at a classification such as this should be considered as definite or decisive or in any way representative of the thought of any one individual. First of all, it is very difficult to judge what is in a man's mind simply from his words, even though they be his own. An obvious instance of this is the very problem we are undertaking, the dispute between Ferrara and Cajetan. Secondly, our only purpose here is to point out, as was indicated above, how most modern scholastics have adopted the same basic distinctions of ens nominaliter and ens participialiter.

Among those who seem to show a preference for ens nominaliter as outlined by Ferrara, we might mention, first of all, Gredt. In pointing out the impossibility of arriving at a definition of being, Gredt tells us that we can, nevertheless, describe it improperly by resolving it into its entitative or constituent parts, namely, the subject and the form of being: Ens est habens esse seu id quod est. Like all concepts, the concept of being

expresses two things: the subject having the form and the form itself. This form is esse or existence, the subject is the essence. We conceive of being, continues Gredt, as that which is or the subject having esse. (1) In developing this further he says the following.

Ens usurpari potest ut participium et ut nomen. Si sumitur primo modo, importat ipsum essendi actum seu existentiam, sicut studens ut participium importat actum studendi. Si ens sumitur ut nomen, significat id cuius est esse, abstrahendo ab ipso essendi exercitio, sicut studens ut nomen significat eum cuius est studere, licet actu forsitan non studeat. Ens ut participium principalius significat esse, secundarie essentiam seu subjectum habens esse; ens ut nomen significat essentiam connotando esse. (2)

Although the distinctions mentioned here agree for the most part with Ferrara, Gredt introduces, however, the fact that ens nominaliter abstracts from the exercise itself of existence. This is described by Gredt more fully in the following passage.

Ens enim ut nomen significat compositum ex essentia et esse seu essentiam connotando esse. Essentia enim necessario connotat esse, et ita conceptus essentiae idem est ac conceptus entis ut nomen; esse autem concipitur ut quo, seu ut forma, et ita connotat necessario subjectum seu essentiam, cuius est forma. (3)

It will be noted, however, that although ens nominaliter signifies the composite of essence and esse, the concept of being is the same as

(1) Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae, Metaphysica Generalis, P. I, n. 616, p. 4, (Fourth ed. Fribourg, 1926).

(2) Ibid., n. 616, p. 5.

(3) Ibid., n. 619, p. 6.

the concept of essence. Elsewhere Gredt says this more explicitly. But at times, he seems to refer not to the composite, but to the essence by itself: "Ens nominaliter sumptum dici de essentia, per se patet; ens enim nominaliter sumptum est essentia, et dicitur etiam de existentia, non ut quod, sed ut quod". (1) This is the being that is divided into the predicaments and the object of Metaphysics. (2)

As far as it is possible to judge, the same idea is expressed likewise by Rickaby, although he does not go into the matter in detail. But he does say very definitely that, for him, being means thing.

According to our account of it, being is in one way a determinate idea; it has a fixed content, though this is the smallest possible. It contains only one note in its comprehension, but it really does contain one. Therefore, we say definitely being means thing..... No doubt there may be an inclination to refuse acquiescence in the arrangement because of a certain unwillingness to let the element of actual existence drop out of the explicit signification of being, which in its primary force, as a participle of the substantive verb, asserts this very character of existence. Still we have shown that herein Being has only shared the common fate of its kind. Just as a Protestant, in these days of easy tolerance, might pass all his days without ever actually protesting, and yet have claim to his title because his position is one that might lead naturally to a protestation; so a Being may never actually be, and yet deserve its name, because it truly presents an actualizable nature. (3)

A similar account is given by Palmieri, who, although he does not hold a real distinction between essence and existence, seems to be inclined to the position of ens nominaliter.

(1) Ibid., n. 617, p. 6.

(2) Ibid., n. 612, p. 9.

(3) Rickaby, General Metaphysics (New York, 1890) pp. 24, 25.

The proper object of Ontology is being in the sense of essence, since Ontology considers the essences of things, prescindling from their actual existence, so much so that when it comes to treat of existence, it regards this not as bare existence, but as being itself something either actual or potential..... Though the objective concept of being is made to express both essence and existence, nevertheless it is not a compound notion, that is, not a notion such as can be split up into two elements, each conceivable apart. Essence and existence cannot be so resolved, because the existence signified by the being is nothing more than the essence itself as actualised. (1)

Goffey in his Ontology expresses a view somewhat similar to that outlined by Rickaby. Speaking of being he says: "The term 'Being' as present participle of the verb to be means existing. But the participle has come to be used as a noun; and as such it does not necessarily imply actual existence hic et nunc. It does indeed imply some relation to actual existence; for we designate as being (in the substantive sense) only whatever we conceive as actually existing or at least capable of existing; and it is from the participial sense, which implies actual existence, that the substantive sense has been derived". (2) Further on he tells us that "the being which is thus determined into the supreme categories of substance and accidents is, of course, being considered substantially as essential (whether possible or actual), and not merely being that is actually existent, existential being, in the participial sense". (3)

(1) Palmieri, Ontologia, c. 1, a. 1, p. 271.

(2) Goffey, Ontology, (New York, 1938), p. 32.

(3) Ibid., p. 212.